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Employment Arbitration 2011: A Realist’s View 
LAURA J. COOPER* 
Nearly two years ago, when this symposium was organized, its title, asking 
whether the Obama administration might offer an opportunity for “hope and 
change” in labor and employment law, was a question that might seriously be 
addressed, rather than posed only sarcastically. Barack Obama had been 
inaugurated in 2009 after campaigning on a legislative platform to enact new 
worker-protection rights.1 On inauguration day, the president could look down 
Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House with a realistic expectation that 
Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and Senate would enact his 
labor and employment law agenda.2 At first, it appeared that the legislative agenda 
might be quickly on the road to enactment. The very first piece of any kind of 
legislation that the new president signed was the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009. The Ledbetter Act overruled a Supreme Court decision and extended the 
statute of limitations for claims of discriminatory compensation so that it 
commenced upon discovery of discrimination rather than upon the date on which 
the disparity arose (possibly unknown to the would-be plaintiff).3 In retrospect, 
however, the Ledbetter Act turned out not to be the first law in a wave of Obama 
administration worker-protection legislation. Instead, it proved nearly as much the 
end as the beginning. Opposition to the president’s health care initiative resulted in 
a lengthy and embittering battle that consumed Congress’s attention and the 
administration’s focus and energy.4 After passage of the health care law it seemed 
possible that Congress would return to a progressive agenda for worker-protection 
legislation. Any such possibility, however, was securely foreclosed by the 
November 2010 midterm election, when Republicans gained control of the House, 
and when the Democratic majority in the Senate significantly narrowed.5 Even the 
most optimistic workers’ rights advocate now must abandon hope for legislative 
change for the foreseeable future. 
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 1. See Politics: High Priority in Democrats’ 2008 Platform Is “Good Jobs with Good 
Pay and Benefits,” 168 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-7 (Aug. 29, 2008). 
 2. Derrick Cain & Larry Swisher, Legislation: Congress Gears Up with Large Job-
Creation Package, Pay Equity, Card Check Bills, 15 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) S-5 (Jan. 27, 
2009). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 181, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (overruling Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)).  
 4. Derrick Cain, Labor Law: Consideration of EFCA on Hold in Senate as Health 
Care, Other Bills Given Priority, 168 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-11 (Sept. 2, 2009).  
 5. Derrick Cain, Amber McKinney & Stephen Lee, Legislation: House Republican 
Agenda Likely to Stymie Various Labor-Related Bills Such as EFCA, 212 Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) AA-1 (Nov. 3, 2010). 
318 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:317 
 
Among the legislative initiatives that we must move to the list of “not now, 
likely never” is the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA).6 Section 4 of the proposed Act 
would have amended the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),7 to add: “No predispute 
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of . . . an 
employment, consumer, or franchise dispute . . . or . . . a dispute arising under any 
statute intended to protect civil rights.”8 What should be the role of academics at 
such a moment? Is this the time for academics to continue to fight, against all odds, 
the “good fight” for enactment of the AFA? Is this the time for academics entirely 
to abandon the debate over ideal procedural structures for the resolution of 
employment disputes and instead propose new substantive rights for employees 
that are even less likely to be enacted? Or is this the time to abandon support for the 
abolitionist objective of the AFA in favor of a more modest legislative proposal of 
structural and procedural mechanisms that might enhance the fairness of mandatory 
predispute arbitration? This panel includes three presentations on employment 
arbitration—by David S. Schwartz;9 by Zev J. Eigen, Nicholas F. Menillo, and 
David Sherwyn;10 and by Martin H. Malin.11 The presentations each pursue one of 
these directions.  
I begin with the assumption that all of the presenters on this panel proceed in 
good faith from the proposition that workers who have legitimate legal claims 
arising from state and federal statutes and from state common law should have a 
realistic opportunity to pursue their claims in an adjudicatory forum that will offer 
fair consideration of the facts of their case in light of the governing law and that 
will offer remedies to the extent afforded by those laws. Beginning with that 
objective, however, each of the presenters encourages legislators to pursue that 
objective by different means.  
Professor David S. Schwartz, in his essay in this symposium, Claim-Suppressing 
Arbitration: The New Rules, advocates overruling the line of Supreme Court cases, 
beginning with Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.12 that have 
interpreted the FAA to compel enforcement of arbitration provisions contained in 
adhesion contracts against consumers and employees seeking to enforce statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 8. S. 931 § 4; H.R. 1020. If enacted, the Arbitration Fairness Act would have 
invalidated a large number of existing predispute employment arbitration agreements. As of 
2003, the American Arbitration Association reported that it alone was administering 
arbitration plans covering six million American workers. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment 
Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., May/July 2003, at 8, 10. 
 9. David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239 
(2012). 
 10. Zev. J. Eigen, Nicholas F. Menillo & David Sherwyn, Shifting the Paradigm of the 
Debate: A Proposal to Eliminate At-Will Employment & Implement a “Mandatory 
Arbitration Act,” 87 IND. L.J 271 (2012). 
 11. Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an 
All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289 (2012). 
 12. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
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claims in court.13 Schwartz calls for enactment of the AFA.14 His agenda is thus 
entirely legislative and abolitionist.  
Schwartz seeks to define the ground rules for the debate over whether 
mandatory arbitration of employment claims can, on balance, yield positive results 
for employees when examined from the perspective of the workforce as a whole, 
rather than from the perspective of employees with claims that would likely yield a 
higher damage award in court than in arbitration. Among the ground rules he 
proposes is that no one should be able to claim that mandatory arbitration is 
outcome neutral until its advocates are able to prove it so by “rigorous, 
methodologically sound research.”15 Such a ground rule, however, is itself not 
neutral as this may well be a case in which empiricism cannot supply the answer. In 
the absence of a mechanism for assigning large numbers of employment cases 
randomly either to arbitration or to litigation—an experimental design that could 
not legally be created consistently with due process—claims about the effect of the 
forum on outcome simply cannot be tested by “rigorous, methodologically sound 
research.” In short, by imposing the burden of persuasion on advocates of 
mandatory arbitration, Schwartz is, by fiat, both opening and closing the empirical 
debate in his favor. Such a ground rule not only cuts off a legitimate debate, based 
on the world as it can be known, but it seeks to defend a position entirely contrary 
to the world that actually exists. We must acknowledge that the status quo is not a 
world in which mandatory employment arbitration is an open public policy 
question, but rather it is a world in which mandatory employment arbitration is the 
law, and furthermore a law that is not going to be altered by legislative enactment.  
Apart from proposing his empirical ground rule, Schwartz bases his attack on 
mandatory arbitration on two principles: (1) that arbitrators cannot be neutral 
decision makers when they have a financial stake in continued business; and (2) 
that an adjudication procedure cannot be fair if the wealthier and more powerful 
party has exclusive control over those procedures.16 While these propositions may 
have validity in the abstract, one may surely question the factual basis that such 
conditions exist in the reality of employment arbitration. The claim that arbitrators 
lack sufficient integrity to decide cases on their merits because of their self-interest 
in being selected for future cases is an old one. It was prominent in the criticism 
that Judge Paul R. Hayes directed at labor arbitrators in the 1960s.17 The empirical 
test of that proposition, as applied to labor arbitration, is whether the union and 
management consumers of labor arbitration, or the courts in considering cases 
raising duty of fair representation claims or reviewing labor arbitration awards 
have, since Hayes’s criticism, abandoned labor arbitration or sought to change its 
basic structure. It is obvious that they have not.18 It is no fairer to assert that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 243–44.  
 14. Id. at 240. 
 15. Id. at 249. 
 16. Id. at 245. 
 17. PAUL R. HAYES, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW 112 (1966). 
 18. Further evidence that parties in labor arbitration have faith in the integrity of labor 
arbitrators is shown by the fact that although such parties have the right to have a court 
determine the substantive arbitrability of a particular grievance, United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960), it is not uncommon for 
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arbitrators in nonunion employment cases lack integrity simply as a result of the 
structure of the process.19 Moreover, if one is to speculate about whether 
considerations external to the immediate dispute may influence decision making, 
one ought to be able to observe, for comparative purposes, that federal judges may 
have some self-interest in granting pretrial motions in individual employment cases 
in order to focus on what they may view as more worthy criminal caseloads and 
large commercial litigation. 
The notion that employers have exclusive control over procedures in 
employment arbitration is just not factually accurate. Courts long ago struck down 
the worst abuses and inequities in employer-promulgated procedures20 and most 
employment arbitration cases are today conducted under rules like those of the 
American Arbitration Association, which mandate a fair procedure including 
reasonable discovery.21  
In Shifting the Paradigm of the Debate: A Proposal to Eliminate At-Will 
Employment & Implement a ‘Mandatory Arbitration Act,’ authors Zev. J. Eigen, 
Nicholas F. Menillo, and David Sherwyn, take a somewhat unexpected turn in the 
academic debate about mandatory arbitration.22 Although Sherwyn and Eigen are 
long-time advocates for mandatory arbitration,23 in this paper, they and their 
coauthor, law student Nicholas F. Menillo, seek to put aside that debate, arguing 
that neither postdispute arbitration agreements, nor the alternative process for 
employment discrimination claims—a mix of agency procedure and litigation—are 
ideal structures for adjudicating statutory employment disputes. While Sherwyn 
and Eigen reassert here their advocacy for a model Mandatory Arbitration Act in 
which the federal government would establish fair procedures for employment 
arbitration and license, select, and monitor arbitrators,24 their new focus is not on 
the arbitration debate at all, or at least not directly. They contend that the answer to 
the inadequacies of the legal process that combines agency procedure and litigation 
to resolve employment discrimination claims is replacing it with not just an 
alternative procedural mechanism but an alternative substantive right, which they 
describe as elimination of the doctrine of at-will employment.  
They propose that an employee in interstate commerce should only be subject to 
termination for cause, or an offer of severance pay.25 The severance pay would be 
                                                                                                                 
parties to permit labor arbitrators to decide substantive arbitrability issues. See FY 2010 
Arbitration Statistics, FED. MEDIATION & CONCIL. SERV., http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/ 
itemDetail.asp?categoryID=196&itemID=22840 (illustrating types of issues arbitrated). 
 19. Professor Malin cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), for a much narrower proposition. Professor Malin does not 
suggest that merely because employment arbitrators are paid by the parties they are rendered 
incapable of fairly deciding most employment issues. Instead, he asserts that the Supreme 
Court should not have vested employment arbitrators, because of financial self-interest, with 
the authority to decide a specific issue—whether the agreement to arbitrate all claims arising 
from the employment relationship is valid. Malin, supra note 11, at 304–05 & n.104. 
 20. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 21. Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2009), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904. 
 22. Eigen et al., supra note 10, at 285–87.  
 23. Id. at 271–72 nn.4–5. 
 24. Id. at 280–82. 
 25. Id. at 285. The coauthors do not attempt in their article to propose a statutory 
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equal to two weeks’ pay for each year of employment, with a minimum of two 
weeks’ pay and a maximum of one year’s pay.26 Employers not claiming that the 
employee was discharged for cause would have to offer the statutory severance 
payment. Employees who accept the severance payment would be precluded from 
pursuing a discrimination claim. Employees who refuse the severance payment 
could proceed to a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). If the ALJ 
finds no cause for termination, the employee is awarded severance pay, costs, and 
fees, and the right to file a discrimination case in court. If the ALJ finds cause, the 
employee goes away empty-handed, without any severance pay, and without the 
right to file a discrimination claim.  
This proposed system, combining potential severance payments to all employees 
discharged without cause and creating a government adjudicatory system to 
adjudicate cause, would require significant additional expenditures by both 
employers and the government, and impose additional burdens on employees with 
valid discrimination claims. Employers would be required to provide severance 
payments to employees discharged in circumstances not satisfying the statutory 
definition of cause. Employers would incur the cost of defending determinations of 
cause in ALJ proceedings. In some not insignificant number of cases, the employer 
would still continue to have to pay litigation costs in addition to these 
administrative costs. The government would incur the cost of establishing and 
funding an agency to process and hear “for cause” cases, and the government 
would have to pay for counsel to represent some employees in the ALJ 
proceedings. Another problem with the proposal is demonstrated by comparing the 
circumstances of two employees. Employee A claims wrongful discharge as well as 
discrimination. Employee B claims wrongful discharge but makes no claim of 
discrimination. Employee A would have to forego immediate receipt of severance 
payments in order to pursue the discrimination claim while Employee B would be 
entitled to immediate receipt of the payments. Thus, Employee A, the most 
wronged employee, unlike Employee B, the one not discriminated against, would 
be left with limited resources for ordinary living expenses and would incur, as a 
result, greater difficulty in securing private counsel to pursue the discrimination 
claim. Moreover, employees with potential discrimination claims would find 
judicial relief further postponed as they would need first to complete the 
administrative adjudicatory process to determine cause.  
The combination of these inequities and the overwhelming costs the proposed 
statute would impose on employers and the government makes this scheme 
profoundly unlikely to be enacted. Far more modest proposals, such as the Model 
Employment Termination Act,27 have failed to achieve legislative success in more 
than one state.28 The likelihood of passage of such a cost-increasing statute as the 
coauthors propose is especially unlikely at the present time when governments are 
making radical reductions in existing programs in order to reduce budget 
imbalances, and when legislators are especially hostile to legislation that would 
increase employers’ costs and discourage hiring of additional workers. 
                                                                                                                 
definition of “cause.” Id. at 286. 
 26. Id. at 286.  
 27. MODEL EMP’T TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 300 (2002). 
 28. The exception is Montana’s Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, Mont. 
Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901 to 915 (2009). 
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Professor Martin H. Malin, in his symposium article, The Arbitration Fairness 
Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, takes what he 
describes as the “middle ground” in the debate over the Arbitration Fairness Act, 
neither favoring mandatory arbitration as it exists nor calling for its abolition.29 
Professor Malin does an admirable job in neutrally collecting, surveying, and 
assessing the empirical evidence about whether the arbitration process 
disadvantages employment law plaintiffs.30 Ultimately, however, he concludes that 
even if, to some extent, employees are disadvantaged by having to pursue their 
employment claims in arbitration, the better remedy is to eliminate the specific 
sources of that disadvantage, rather than to prohibit arbitration entirely.31 Malin 
asserts that the system of employment arbitration that has emerged and evolved in 
the wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.32 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Adams33 has failed to provide adequate internal mechanisms of self-regulation to 
assure procedural fairness and that the judiciary has failed to fill the void.34 He 
contends that legislative reform is necessary.35  
First, Professor Malin recommends legislation to require that employment 
arbitration meet minimum standards of due process.36 These, he suggests, include 
assuring employees the right to representation by counsel, granting arbitrators the 
authority to order necessary discovery and full statutory remedies, and precluding 
employers from truncating statutory limitations periods for filing claims.37 Second, 
he proposes reforms directed not to changing arbitration procedures, but rather to 
the structure of the arbitration system itself.38 He calls for requiring arbitration-
appointing agencies to use neutral, objective criteria for listing arbitrators on their 
rosters, requiring such agencies to use random methods for appointing arbitrators to 
arbitration panels, and requiring arbitrators to disclose to the parties prior dealings 
with the parties, their counsel, and their counsels’ law firms.39 These structural 
proposals are modest, indeed so modest that they, even if enacted, might make little 
noticeable difference in the arbitration process as experienced by employees 
mandated to use it as their only recourse for workplace justice.  
Third, Malin addresses the phenomenon of employers using arbitration 
agreements as a vehicle to force employees to waive their right to bring class action 
employment claims.40 Here, Malin’s recommendation is more radical and 
fundamental. Rather than suggesting that the law should preclude such waivers 
within arbitration agreements, he contends that the arbitration process is so ill-
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Malin, supra note 11, at 290. 
 30. Id. at 291–96. 
 31. Id. at 312. 
 32. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  
 33. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).  
 34. Malin, supra note 11, at 312. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 313. 
 40. Id. at 314. 
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suited to class claims that legislation should preclude any waivers of employees’ 
ability to submit class actions in a judicial forum.41  
Thus, in these papers—by David S. Schwartz;42 by Zev J. Eigen, Nicholas F. 
Menillo, and David Sherwyn;43 and by Martin H. Malin44—we have three 
alternative proposals for better protecting the substantive and procedural rights of 
American workers, each of which looks to legislation for the desired reforms. In 
light of the preemptive role of the FAA, which precludes states from regulating 
arbitration affecting interstate commerce,45 and the desired universality of the 
authors’ proposals, when these authors seek legislation, they necessarily mean 
legislation by the U.S. Congress. A realist, however, must immediately recognize 
that even the most modest of these proposals is not going to be enacted in today’s 
political environment, or even one that we can presently envision on the distant 
horizon.  
Realistic hope for improving procedural justice for workers should now be 
directed not at the legislature but at the judiciary. Recent history teaches an 
important lesson. The plaintiffs’ lawyers who chose, for too long, to defend the 
extreme position that all mandatory predispute employment arbitration agreements 
should be unenforceable, ended up ceding the design of arbitration procedures 
largely to the courts and to the employers without the leavening guidance that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys might have provided. Academics who focus on grand ideas 
with no chance of legislative enactment similarly may be losing the opportunity to 
play an affirmative role in the courts to develop a better process for workplace 
justice. While opportunities to persuade legislators by broad policy arguments may 
no longer be available, individual judges still can be shown real cases of real 
workers in which the employment arbitration process or its outcomes are patently 
unfair.  
There are many battles that can still be won in the courts. Let me identify a few. 
Attention should be paid to the standards that the courts are applying to judicial 
review of employment arbitration awards. Plaintiffs are entitled to realize Gilmer’s 
promise that arbitration provides an alternative procedure, not a lesser body of 
substantive statutory rights.46 Academic writers need to draw the courts’ attention 
to those instances in which procedural limitations interfere with realizing statutory 
rights.47 Commentators need to highlight for the judiciary distinctions between 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Schwartz, supra note 9.  
 43. Eigen et al., supra note 10.  
 44. Malin, supra note 11.  
 45. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14−15 (1984). 
 46. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (“[W]e recognized that ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory 
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to 
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’” (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985))). 
 47. Professor Malin advances that objective with the section in his paper identifying 
recent lower court decisions declining to intervene when confronted with apparently unfair 
procedural limitations on the ground that arbitrators may subsequently remedy the 
unfairness. Malin, supra note 11, at 302–08. 
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precedents governing judicial review of labor arbitration and those governing 
employment arbitration awards to put an end to the casual borrowing of deferential 
labor arbitration precedents when reviewing awards arising in the quite different 
context of employment arbitration. The employment arbitration setting warrants 
more aggressive judicial review, both because statutory rights are at stake, and 
because the greater inequality of power and resources casts doubt on procedural 
and substantive fairness. 
Academics risk irrelevance if they devote their effort and creativity to proposing 
legislative reforms that lack any possible chance of enactment. A realist asks what 
incremental improvement might be achieved in the struggle for workplace justice if 
academics would instead focus on the world as it is and help the judiciary see the 
real injustices that arise in individual cases that cry out for new precedents to better 
protect the rights of workers. 
